olition。 For a person is a specific existence; not man in general (a term to which no
real existence corresponds); but a particular human being。 The term “character” likewise
expresses this idiosyncrasy of Will and Intelligence。 But Character prehends all peculiarities
whatever; the way in which a person conducts himself in private relations; &c。; and is not limited
to his idiosyncrasy in its practical and active phase。 I shall; therefore; use the term “passion;”
understanding thereby the particular bent of character; as far as the peculiarities of volition are not
limited to private interest; but supply the impelling and actuating force for acplishing deeds
shared in by the munity at large。 Passion is in the first instance the subjective; and therefore
the formal side of energy; will; and activity — leaving the object or aim still undetermined。 And
there is a similar relation of formality to reality in merely individual conviction; individual views;
individual conscience。 It is always a question; of essential importance; what is the purport of my
conviction; what the object of my passion; in deciding whether the one or the other is of a true and
substantial nature。 Conversely; if it is so; it will inevitably attain actual existence — be realised。
§ 27
From this ment on the second essential element in the historical embodiment of an aim; we
infer — glancing at the institution of the State in passing — that a State is then well constituted and
internally powerful; when the private interest of its citizens is one with the mon interest of the
State; when the one finds its gratification and realisation in the other; — a proposition in itself very
imp